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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
discharge defendant of his liability. Negligence which occurs prior to the
defendant's negligence is of no effect at all. Negligence which occurs sub-
sequent to the defendant's negligence can only serve to mitigate damages.
MERRILL C. HoYT
ASSUMPTION OF RISK AS A DEFENSE IN MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION
William Prosser, in his treatise on Torts,' discusses three situations
that give rise to the defense of assumption of risk. The first occurs when
the plaintiff has expressly given his consent to relieve defendant from a
duty and has decided to take his chances of injury from a known risk. The
second occurs when the plaintiff, with knowledge of the risk, voluntarily
enters into some relation with the defendant which will probably result in
encountering the known danger. The third situation exists when the plain-
tiff becomes aware of a risk already created by the negligence of the defen-
dant and elects to continue in the face of the danger.
All three require that the plaintiff has knowledge of the danger that
is to be encountered and voluntarily elects to meet it. If the plaintiff's de-
cision to take the risk is in itself unreasonable, below the standard of the
reasonable man, the conduct is a form of contributory negligence. Due to
this overlap, many courts fail to distinguish between contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk.2
The difficulty in applying assumption of risk to cases of medical mal-
practice is that plaintiff must be shown to have had knowledge of the risk
assumed and to have voluntarily chosen to meet that risk. Proving these
two elements is difficult at best. A patient may be aware of the dangers in-
herent in various medical procedures, but he rarely has any real choice in
selecting the treatment given. When he is offered alternatives, both being
thoroughly explained, the charge of negligence is most often grounded in
an improper execution of the technique or procedure selected, rather than
in an improper selection of the technique or procedure utilized.
Another factor, peculiar to cases of surgery and emergency treatment,
which makes assumption of risk inapplicable is the usual unconsciousness
of the patient at the time of the alleged negligence of the physician. A
patient who has neither control over what is being done, nor awareness of
the physician's activities, cannot be said to have had knowledge of the risk
assumed coupled with a voluntary election to meet it. However, under such
circumstances, it would be equally difficult to prove contributory negli-
gence.
I Prosser, Torts § 67 (3d ed. 1964).
2 Ibid.
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN ILLINOIS
In general, though assumption of risk and contributory negligence
often overlap, it is much simpler to prove contributory negligence. Assump-
tion of risk requires that the plaintiff both know and understand the risk
incurred and voluntarily choose to meet that risk.3 If the decision to meet a
known risk is unreasonable, then the plaintiff is also guilty of contributory
negligence. Thus, when the plaintiff is charged with refusing to cooperate
with the defendant-physician, it is easier to show that the plaintiff's be-
havior is unreasonable, than it is to prove that the plaintiff, while having
full knowledge of the probable consequences, voluntarily failed to co-
operate, or selected the treatment now being complained of, or in some
other way obstructed the course of treatment. For this reason, assumption
of risk is rarely used in malpractice cases.
There are no reported Illinois malpractice cases which rest on the
theory of assumption of risk, and there are only a few from other jurisdic-
tions that do. In the main, the reported cases that do rest on assumption of
risk concern the selection of a faith healer to effect a cure.4 Those cases do
not concern medical practitioners and are thus beyond the scope of this
article. Three of the cases that do involve medical practitioners are dis-
cussed below.
In the case of Hales v. Raines,5 the Missouri Court was faced with an
assumption of risk problem. The defendant claimed that he had informed
the plaintiff that the use of X-rays to treat a skin condition was somewhat
dangerous. The patient nevertheless agreed to undergo treatment. The de-
fendant claimed that this amounted to an assumption of the risk and thus,
the trial court erred in not giving the jury an instruction concerning that
defense. The appellate court agreed, but went on to say that the plaintiff
assumed the risk inherent in the use of X-rays, but not the risk that the de-
fendant would prove to be negligent in administering the treatment.
A similar situation was again presented to the Missouri court a few
years later. In the case of Gross v. Robinson,6 the court held that though
the plaintiff was warned of the dangers of too many X-ray exposures, and
thus assumed that risk, he did not assume the risk of too many exposures
with a machine that was not in proper working order.
Though neither of these cases adequately defines assumption of risk,
they do illustrate that the risk assumed by a patient may be quite narrow
and if the injury is caused by an event beyond the scope of that risk, the
defendant will be liable.
Illustrative of how difficult it is to prove that a plaintiff assumed a
3 Ibid.
4 Faith healers are not medical practitioners and thus, that problem will not be dis-
cussed here. For an annotation of the subject, see Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 1219 (1951).
5 162 Mo. App. 46, 141 S.W. 924 (1911).
6 203 Mo. App. 118, 218 S.W. 924 (1920).
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known risk is the New Mexico Case of Los Alamos Medical Center v. Coe7
In that case, the plaintiff was allowed to take morphine at home for relief
of pain as needed. The defendant-doctor assured the plaintiff and her family
not to worry and to give the plaintiff morphine whenever she wanted it.
Relying on this instruction, they administered the drug and the plaintiff
became addicted. The court held that the plaintiff did not assume the risk,
as she was justified in relying on the superior knowledge of her doctor. The
plaintiff was under no duty to distrust her physician or to set her judg-
ment against his.
It is the very disparity in knowledge between a patient and his doctor
that makes assumption of risk an unlikely defense in malpractice litiga-
tion. Given this disparity, the assumption of a known risk becomes virtu-
ally impossible. It is evident that in following a physician's directions, a
peculiar set of circumstances would have to arise before a plaintiff could
be said to have assumed a known risk. It is probable that an express warn-
ing would be required, or that the facts be such that an ordinary man
would know the consequences. It is the very peculiarity of the necessary
fact situation, combined with the availability of contributory negligence as
a defense, that has resulted in assumption of risk being virtually forgotten
in cases of medical malpractice.8
MERRILL C. Hoxr
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS A BAR IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
When the statute of limitations is pleaded as a bar to a malpractice
claim, three problems peculiar to this kind of litigation arise. These prob-
lems are: (1) Which section of the statute is applicable? (2) When does the
statute begin to run? and (3) What kind of acts constitute the fraud that
tolls the statute?
WHICH SECTION OF THE STATUTE Is APPLICABLE?
In Illinois, there are three possible solutions to the problem of which
statute applies. Chapter 83, § 15 of the Illinois Revised Statutes places a
two year limitation on actions for personal injuries1 ; Chapter 83, § 16 places
7 58 N.M. 686, 257 P.2d 175 (1954).
8 In Maki v. Frelk, 85 Ill. App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284 (2d Dist. 1967), the Appellate
Court for the Second District held that the doctrine of contributory negligence as a
complete bar to recovery would be abandoned and that the doctrine of comparative
negligence would henceforth be used. If the holding of the Maki case is accepted by the
other appellate districts or by the Illinois Supreme Court, it can readily be predicted that
defense attorneys will attempt to make more use of the assumption of risk defense, since
it is a complete defense while comparative negligence is not.
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 83, § 15 (1965). [Personal injuries, penalties, etc.] Action for dam-
